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Abstract: This paper advances an approach to presupposition rooted in the
concept of commitment, a dialectical notion weaker than truth and belief. It
investigates ancient medieval dialectical theories and develops the insights
thereof for analyzing how presuppositions are evaluated and why a proposition
is presupposed. In particular, at a pragmatic level, presuppositions are recon-
structed as the conclusions of implicit arguments from presumptive reasoning,
grounded on presumptions of different type and nature. A false (or rather
unaccepted) presupposition can be thus represented as the outcome of a conflict
of presumptions – the ones used by the speaker and the ones commonly
accepted or backed by evidence. From an interpretative perspective, this
defaulted presumptive reasoning can be explained by comparing the available
presumptions and repaired by replacing the weaker and unacceptable ones.
Keywords: presupposition, argumentation schemes, pragmatics, presumptions,
commitment
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of presupposition is one of the most debated issues in philo-
sophy of language. It is normally related to puzzles concerning the cancellation,
suspension, or neutralization of presuppositions (Capone 2017), or the truth-
value of statements with false presuppositions, such as the famous, “The king of
France is bald.” In the modern philosophical tradition, such puzzles have been
investigated starting from the works of Frege (Frege 1948), Russell (Russell
1905), and Strawson (Strawson 1964). This theoretical debate, however, is only
apparently recent. The history of presuppositional puzzles goes back to ancient
dialectical dilemmas, such as the horned man paradox (Seuren 2005), which
were addressed in many medieval works that constituted the backbone of
ancient dialectics. The goal of this paper is bring to light the traditional analysis
of presupposition, and build on the ancient distinctions to propose a dialectical
approach to this problem, where “dialectical” refers to the traditional art of
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reasoning in discourse currently revived in contemporary argumentation the-
ories(Walton 2006; Toulmin 1958; Kienpointner 1992, 2001).
This dialectical (argumentative) approach can provide a different perspective
within the philosophical discussions concerning presupposition. In particular, it is
claimed that presuppositions can be investigated in terms of commitments,
namely a type of socially bind relation (Seuren 2009:140) (dialectical obligation)
resulting from the explicit or implicit acceptance of a proposition. Moreover, this
account can help explain how a presupposition affects the commitments of the
hearer, and how the latter can deny an unaccepted presupposition. It can provide
a possible representation of the reasoning mechanism underlying a presupposi-
tion, namely its presumptive effect. Finally, it can advance a theoretical explana-
tion of presuppositional failures, and predict operationally how they can be
assessed, accounted for, and repaired in terms of presumptions.
2 Presuppositions in dialectics
The medieval logicians addressed dilemmas of presupposition somehow similar
to the ones currently debated in philosophy. The ancient solutions to these
problems can provide new insights and distinctions that can be combined
with the modern advances, and suggest a dialectical, commitment-based
approach to presupposition.
2.1 Presuppositional puzzles in the dialectical tradition
In the medieval tradition, philosophers struggled with two crucial presupposi-
tional problems, some presuppositional triggers belonging to the category of
syncategorematic words (for example “only” or “to stop”) and the negation of
propositions with subjects referring to non-existent entities (“the chimaera is
flying”) (Seuren 2010:chap. 10).
Coherent with the Aristotelian two-valued logic, medieval logicians did not
postulate the possibility of the lack of a truth-value (Seuren 2005). In contrast,
the syncategorematic presupposition triggers were studied as a conjunction of
propositions. For example, in Abelard (Abaelardus, Dialectica, 332) and William
of Sherwood (William of Sherwood, Treatise on Syncategorematic words, 12, 15),
sentences such as “Only Socrates runs” are analyzed as constituted of two
propositions, one positive (Socrates runs) and the other negative (no one else
runs).The relationship between the exclusive proposition and the one under-
lying the excluding adverb (preiacens) was set out by Peter of Spain as follows
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(Horn 2011:199): “every true exclusive proposition leaves the truth of the basic
proposition intact” (Petrus Hispanus Syncategoreumata, III, 10). This relation
cannot be considered as a presuppositional relation (contra Horn 1996: 300; see
Seuren 2005), since it concerns the double meaning of an exclusive proposition,
from which it is possible to infer the truth of two propositions that are logically
at the same level (they are both “included” in the original proposition) (Petrus
Hispanus Syncategoreumata, III, 22).
The problem of propositions with non-existent referents was addressed by
considering the possible inferences that can be drawn from them, and the
different types of negation. The inference from the attribution of a predicate to
a subject to the existence of the referent thereof (Ashworth 1973) was regarded
by Abelard as material or imperfect, namely depending on the nature of the
predicate (MacFarlane 2015). This account can explain some sophisms com-
monly addressed in the Middle Ages, such as the following (Petrus Hispanus
Summulae Logicales, VIII, 122; Abaelardus Dialectica, 137):
A chimera is a matter of opinion (est opinabile)
Therefore there is a chimera
The inference in this case does not hold because the predicate (“to be matter of
opinion”) does not “contain” the existence of the subject (De Libera 2011:466;
Seuren 2010:364–365).
On Abelard’s view, a proposition can be negated in two fashions: by means
of an extinctive negation (“it is false that the chimaera is flying,” later called
“total removal” by Thomas Aquinas, in Expositio libri Peryermeneias, I, 10, 18)
or through a separative negation (“the chimaera is not flying”) (Martin 2012;
Martin 2004). However, Abelard pointed out that while in case of a separative
negation the subject is taken as existent, an extinctive negation does not lead to
inferring either its existence or its non-existence (Abaelardus Dialectica,177). In
case of the chimaera, the proposition is “very false” as the chimera does not
exist (Ashworth 1973).
The term “praesuppositio”was introduced by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth
century to refer to a specific epistemic and dialectical attitude towards a proposi-
tion, namely the previous acceptance of a proposition (Aquinas In Libros
Metaphysicorum Expositio, VII, 17, 19). In this sense, a presupposition is close to
the concept of pragmatic presupposition (Stalnaker 1974; Simons 2003; Capone
2017). According to Aquinas, the possibility of asking a question depends on the
knowledge (and more precisely the interlocutor’s knowledge) of the presupposed
proposition. Aquinas used the term “praesuppositio” also in an absolute sense to
refer to a condition of the order of reason (Rhonheimer 2000), andmore precisely to
a semantic implication from a predicate (e. g. “to be red”) to a precondition of the
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predication (e. g. “to be a surface”). This relation results from the “essence” (namely
the definition) of the predicate (McCabe 1969:65–69), which establishes a rule of
predication consisting in the previous acceptance of its precondition (Summa
Theologiae, 1a, 76, a3). According to Aquinas, “presupposition” is characterized
by its definitional nature and its logical anteriority, or precedence in the “order of
intelligence” (Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, a14). By pointing out that one property
logically precedes (or presupposes) another, Aquinas infers that, if we grant the
latter, we must admit the former. In this sense, logical presuppositions are pre-
conditions or rules of the language game and are taken as accepted by the inter-
locutors (McCabe 1969:68).
These presuppositional puzzles were investigated in the Middles Ages using
a twofold approach to verification. A proposition was verified either absolutely,
at a “metaphysical” level (through a comparison with an objective state of
affairs), or dialectically, by assessing the consistency of a sentence with the
set of sentences previously agreed upon by the participants to a dialogue,
nowadays called “commitments.” Such agreed upon sentences constitute the
interlocutors’ “obligations” (Martin 2001; Uckelman 2013; Novaes Dutilh 2007:
chap. 3), limiting the interlocutors’ freedom to contradict or deny them. On the
dialectical (commitment-based) account of verification, a sentence needs to be
assessed considering the commitment set of the participant that is evaluating it.
A presupposition is thus evaluated considering what the participant holds as
true; if the hearer is committed to the truth of sentences contradictory or
incompatible with it, s/he will classify it as false. Otherwise, the hearer can
hold it as true or as provisionally true (Schlenker 2008:169).
2.2 A dialectical approach to presupposition
In the ancient approaches to presupposition, we can identify three interrelated
problems, which result from three distinct levels of analysis:
1. At a dialectical (pragmatic) level, a presupposition consists in taking for
granted the interlocutor’s knowledge of a proposition on which the felicity of
a speech act depends (as Aquinas put it, nothing is asked when the pre-
supposition of a question is not known by the hearer).
2. At a logical-semantic level, presuppositions are the conditions of predica-
tion, namely the requirements that need to be fulfilled for a predicate to be
correctly used. Presuppositions are thus semantic preconditions that depend
on the definition of the predicate used. Presuppositional failure results in ill-
formed sentences, characterized by the ungrammatical use of a predicate.
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3. At a logical level (in which no interlocutor nor any prior knowledge is taken
into consideration), presuppositions are regarded as inferences that are
triggered by the logical subject of a predication, and thus result from both
the affirmation and the separative negation of a proposition. The falsity of a
presupposition results in the falsity of the proposition from which it is
inferred. However, the denial of a presupposition results in a stronger denial
of the presupposing proposition, as the opposition between the affirmation
of a proposition and its extinctive negation (denying also the presupposi-
tion) is stronger than a simple separative negation (Seuren 2010:361).
These distinctions can be used to interpret the contemporary discussions on
semantic and pragmatic presupposition (Huang 2014:chap. 3), in particular
drawing a distinction between the logical and the pragmatic level, and the
metaphysical and dialectical account of verification.
From a dialectical perspective, at a logical level a presupposition can be
considered as logically implied by the use of a sentence; it is “a distinguished
part of a bivalent meaning, one that strives to be articulated as a separate
conjunct” (Schlenker 2008:160). In particular, the topical component in the
information structure, which is pragmatically given and thus dialectically
taken as accepted (Gundel and Fretheim 2004:177; Strawson 1971; Atlas 1991,
2004; Beaver 2010), can be logically articulated as a separate conjunct, together
with the asserted component (focus) (p and pp). The asserted component,
however, is true only if the presupposed content is true. Thus, at a logical
level the falsity of a presupposition – such as the falsity of the presupposition
in “The king of France is bald” – ( Schlenker 2008, 181) has three effects:
1. It implies the falsity of the second conjunct (the king of France is bald only if
the king of France exists);
2. It implies the falsity of the conjunction (It is false that the king of France
exist and that the king of France is bald);
3. No further inferences can be drawn concerning the condition of the head of
the king (such as “the king of France is less attractive”).
4. Possible inferences can be drawn from the falsity of the first conjunct (for
example, “France is not a monarchy”).
According to this view, to evaluate a sentence carrying a presupposition, we
need to distinguish between two crucial cases:
a. The presupposition can be assessed as true or false
Ex: The king of France is bald (pp: there is a king of France).
b. The presupposition cannot be assessed as true or false (the referent of the
subject term cannot be identified).
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Ex: Bob was at the party (pp: there is someone called Bob that the hearer
can identify) (uttered to an interlocutor who does not know who Bob is).
In the first case, the presupposition can be reconstructed by the hearer as an
“implicit content” of the sentence token (Bach 1999). Since the presupposi-
tion can be determined and evaluated as false, the sentence is a fortiori false
(or “very false”). In the second case, the hearer cannot reconstruct the
presupposition, as s/he does not know any Bob (Asher and Lascarides
1998:255). For this reason, reference failure results in the impossibility of
assessing the presupposition (Gazdar 1979; Hobbs 1979; Simons 2003; von
Fintel 2008; Atlas 2008; Lewis 1979), and thus the sentence itself is a
spurious (or improper) sentence (Clark and Brennan 1991:226), to which the
criterion of verifiability does not apply and which cannot result in a commit-
ment. In this case, the hearer cannot even reconstruct the proposition
expressed (Macagno 2015; Macagno and Walton 2014:chap. 4). On this per-
spective, the possibility of reconstructing the presupposed content is distin-
guished from its assessment.
The dialectical analysis of presuppositions allows drawing distinctions at
the level in which presuppositions are analyzed. At a logical level, presupposi-
tions are regarded as sentences that are evaluated against a set of pre-existing
commitments and that can be accepted either as true or false. A presupposition
cannot be evaluated for two reasons: either because it is incomplete (and,
therefore, it is not a proposition), or because it cannot be verified considering
the hearer’s commitment store (the hearer does not know whether it is true or
false). In the first case, the sentence itself is spurious. In the second case, the
hearer can evaluate it provisionally as true or false depending on the coherence
thereof with his commitment store, and later on he can still evaluate it differ-
ently depending on the further modifications of his commitments.
This account, however, leads to further questions concerning the pragmatic
level, and more specifically, concerning the relationship between presupposi-
tions and commitments and the dialectical effects of presuppositions.
3 Commitments and presumptive reasoning
At a pragmatic level, presuppositions are analyzed in the literature in terms of
common ground, considering the relationship between “a person and a proposi-
tion” (Stalnaker 1973:447). Thus, presuppositions can be regarded as propositions
that the speaker treats as taken for granted, namely already accepted. From a
dialectical perspective, two problems arise at this level, namely the relationship
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between presuppositions and common ground, and the conditions of the previous
acceptance (vis-à-vis the asserted component) of the presupposed content.
3.1 Presuppositions, common ground, and commitments
The notion of “common ground” as commonly used in pragmatics (Clark and
Brennan 1991; 222; Kecskes and Zhang 2009; see the distinc approach in
Stalnaker 1984) is rooted in the interlocutors’ beliefs or knowledge, which can
hardly explain many cases of presuppositions that cannot be considered part of
the hearer’s beliefs or knowledge (Atlas 2005:144).
In dialectics, the propositions accepted by a participant to a dialogue are
represented as commitments, which can be light-side (propositions explicitly
accepted in the dialogue) or dark-side (propositions proved or presumed to be
accepted by the hearer) (Walton and Krabbe 1995:124–126). Any speech act can
be thus represented as a proposal of updating the interlocutors’ commitment
store (Ginzburg 1994; Ginzburg 1996; Walton and Krabbe 1995:23–24), which can
be either accepted or refused.
Commitments are social responsibilties, dialogical obligations (Hamblin
1970:257) not correponding to beliefs (Ducrot 1984:79; Beyssade and Marandin
2009). They represent an interlocutor’s acceptance of a proposition, namely
treating it as true or at least ignoring the possibility that it is false (Stalnaker
1984:79). One accepts a statement when it is asserted and, in many contexts,
when it is not objected or challenged (Mackenzie and Staines 1999:17; Hamblin
1970:264; Geurts 2017). It is possible to explain why a person commits himself to
a proposition by making hypotheses about his beliefs (S commits to p because S
believes that p is true); however, this is only one of the possible explanations of
his dialectical behavior. From a dialectical perspective, utterances are regarded
considering the socially binding relation that they create (Seuren 2009:140), and
not the intentions and beliefs of the interlocutors.
3.2 Presuppositions, dialectical order, and commitment stores
The notion of commitment characterizes the dialectical approach to communica-
tion (Hamblin 1970; Beyssade and Marandin 2009, 2006). On this perspective,
presuppositions are analyzed as implicit commitments of the hearer (Geurts
1999: 4, 2017; Macagno 2012a, 2015; Macagno and Walton 2014:chap. 5). When
a speaker presupposes some information, s/he is engaging in a specific game
characterized by presumptions (Thomason 1990:337–338), characterizing both
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the interpretive process of the hearer and the interpretable activity of the
speaker (Simons 2007; Levinson 2000:chap. 2). Not only does the speaker act
based on the presumption of cooperativity of the hearer; the hearer is also the
subject of presumptions needed for the hearer’s interpretive activity (what
Levinson refers to as the Recipient’s Corollary of the Speaker’s maxims). Thus,
a speaker can use a presupposition because it can be presumed that securing the
hearer’s acceptance of the presupposed contents would be dialectically useless
or redundant (and in conflict with the pragmatic principle of brevity).
When a speaker presupposes a proposition, he or she acts on and generates
the presumption that there are reasons for considering the presupposition as part
of the “dark-side” commitment store of the interlocutor. In this sense, presupposi-
tions are intimately related to the speaker’s reasons for presupposing, which is the
condition for the hearer’s interpretation (Macagno 2015, 2012a). For example, the
interpretation of the assertion “Bob was at the party” is grounded on the basic
presumption that the speaker has reasons for considering “Bob” and “the (spe-
cific) party (occurred at a specific time in the past)” as part of the hearer’s
commitments. This presumption will be the hearer’s starting point for retrieving
the dark-side commitments, i. e. for finding among the implicit commitments the
individual “Bob” may refer to, and the event that “the party” individuates.
The speaker can also presuppose a proposition that was not previously
accepted nor somehow part of the hearer’s “dark-side” commitments, disrupting
the dialectical order (Thomason 1990). However, communication is often based
on unaccepted commitments that the hearer “accommodates” provisionally
(Brennan and Clark 1996:1484). Sometimes this strategy is used for informative
purposes (Ducrot 1968), such as in the case given above:
Bob was at the party (stated on the headline of a newspaper).
In the context of a newspaper article, the presupposed information (there is
someone important called Bob the journalist is referring to) can be easily
accommodated. The hearer can accept provisionally the commitment, waiting
for further information on the identity of the individual. Informative presupposi-
tions are also used for modifying the dialectical game, leaving up to the inter-
locutor the decision to inquire further into the presupposed but unshared
information. A famous example is the following sentence told by a daughter to
her father, who ignores that she has a boyfriend:
I will be moving to my boyfriend’s place.
The father can reconstruct the presupposition and decide whether to accept it, or
accept it provisionally, investigating the issue by starting a meta-dialogue or
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waiting for further information. The disruption of the dialectical order can be
also only tentative. For example, the question of a bartender,
What are you having?
can be asked without securing the client’s intention to have something to drink
(Capone 2017; Macagno and Capone 2016). Here, the client can accept the
presupposition or reject it. However, depending on the specific context
(a restaurant or a café or pub), the rejection may be easier or more complex,
depending on the grounds that the waiter has for presupposing the client’s
intention (in restaurants clients may want to drink something different from
water; in pubs or cafés, by sitting down the client implicitly agrees to have a
drink). For this reason, the analysis of the presupposition conditions needs to be
focused on the reasons that the speaker has for holding a proposition as part of
the interlocutor’s commitment store.
3.3 The conditions for presupposing
The first and most basic condition consists in the possibility of accessing
(identifying) the presupposed information, namely the hearer needs to be able
to reconstruct the content taken for granted and connect it with his knowledge
or the context (Asher and Lascarides 1998:277; Gazdar 1979; Hobbs 1979). In
other words, the hearer needs to be able to retrieve or at least accommodate the
presupposition (Simons 2003; von Fintel 2008; Atlas 2008; Lewis 1979). This
condition is not enough, as the following possible scenarios result from it.
The presupposition pp is reconstructed and
i) pp can be accepted by the hearer as a background assumption;
ii) pp can be accepted by the hearer as a background assumption provision-
ally (waiting for further information);
iii) pp cannot be accepted by the hearer as it conflicts with other
commitments;
iv) pp cannot be accepted by the hearer as the hearer cannot be presumed to
accept pp.
In order to explain such cases, we can provide variants of the examples men-
tioned above in the paper:
i) a) “What are you having for a drink?” (asked by a waiter to a customer in a
pub). b) “What are you having for a drink?” (asked by a waiter to a
customer in a restaurant). c) “Bob was at Tom’s party as well” (said to a
A dialectical approach 299
Authenticated | fabrizio.macagno@fcsh.unl.pt author's copy
Download Date | 5/1/18 8:22 AM
teenager friend) (the hearer does not know that there was a party, but in
the group of friends Tom is known to organize parties frequently).
ii) a) “Bob was at the party” (read on a newspaper headline) (the hearer does
not know who Bob is, but accepts that there is someone important with
this name). b) “I will be moving to my boyfriend’s place” (told by the
daughter to her father, who was not aware of the existence of a boyfriend).
iii) a) “Bob was at Tom’s party as well” (said by a kid to Bob’s mother) (the
mother knows that Tom did not throw any party, and cannot accept it).
b) “What beer are you having?” (asked by a friend) (the hearer knows that
the restaurant does not serve alcohol).
iv) a) “Bob was at the party as well” (said to a stranger) (the hearer may be not
presumed to know Bob or the party). b) “What meat dish are you having?”
(asked by the waiter of a vegetarian restaurant to his customers).
The cases iii) and iv) are only apparently similar. They are similar because their
effects can fall within the dialectical category of dialectically inappropriate
statements (subject to the ancient accusation “nugaris”). In both cases, the
speaker inserts into the hearer’s commitments a proposition without ensuring
that it has been accepted by the hearer himself (Stalnaker 2008:542). From the
hearer’s perspective the presupposition does not alter his or her commitments
unless s/he accepts the move (Schlenker 2008:161–162). For this reason, s/he
can deny it with an extinctive negation, such as in cases iii): “Bob was not at the
party for sure!”; “I do not think I can have any beer here, I suppose.” Otherwise,
hearer can refuse the move at a meta-dialogical level, namely pointing out that
the assertion is inappropriate and cannot have dialogical effects, such as in
cases iv): “Sorry, what Bob are you talking about?”; “Sorry, what do you mean by
‘meat dish’?” (see also the “Hey, wait a minute!” test of Von Fintel 2004). From a
communicative point of view, in both cases the hearer can correct what the
speaker considers to be shared, bringing to light the “uncommon ground”
between the interlocutors (Macagno and Capone 2016; Capone 2013). However,
the accusation of the inappropriateness of an assertion in iv) needs to be
distinguished from the correction of the presuppositions in cases iii).
The difference between iii) and iv) is at the level of their reasonableness. In
iii), the presuppositions are unshared at an epistemic level, as their inappropri-
ateness can be attributed to either to a tentative deceit or a mistake. In iv), the
presuppositions are not only unshared; they cannot be considered as possibly
part of the hearer’s common ground. They are unreasonable. In order to account
for this difference, we need to take into account the grounds of taking a
proposition for granted, namely the presumptions characterizing the speaker’s
activity (Strawson 1950:332).
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Presupposing a proposition has a specific effect, namely leading the inter-
locutor to holding that the speaker has some reason for taking it for granted. By
presupposing, the speaker indicates that s/he has a reason for presuming that
the hearer either has accepted it already, or can accept it. Therefore, the speaker
needs to have some reasons for concluding that the presupposed proposition
(presented as a possible previous commitment of the hearer) does not openly
conflict with the hearer’s commitments (Atlas and Levinson 1981:40–41), or at
least the ones that heearer holds more steadily. Thus, a proposition can be
presupposed because it has been already accepted by him (it is part of the
context), or (as a weaker criterion) the hearer is not known to be committed to
conflicting propositions (Soames 1982:486).
The reasonableness of presuppositions can explain also the differences
between i) and ii), and ii) and iii). Let us consider i). In case a), in a pub the
intention of buying a drink needs to be presumed, as it is part of an implied contract.
In b), in a restaurant the intention of having a drink and not onlywater is commonly
presumed, as part of social habits. In c), the party the speaker is referring to can be
presumed as it belongs to the propositions shared by the group of friends. The
strength of the reasons for presupposing has a direct effect on the rejection of a
presupposition. The rejection of the presupposition of a) would require arguments
(for not knowing the rule or not intending to comply with it). In c), the lack of
knowledge of the presupposed content can be criticized, and the rejection thereof
would require evidence.
The scenario in ii) is different. The hearer is entitled not to be committed to the
presupposed content and waits (or can wait) for further information. The hearer can
decide to be committed under the condition of being provided with the needed
information or arguments at a later stage of the dialogue or discourse. In iii), the
presuppositions are not acceptable for epistemic reasons. The speaker has a reason
for presuming that the hearer can accept the presupposed content, because either
s/he can be committed to it (in b), or can be at least not be committed to its contrary
(in a). The reasons for presupposing, however, lack in iv), in which the presupposed
contents cannot be presumed to be part of the hearer’s commitment store. Here, the
speaker’s presuppositions are grounded on unreasonable and unacceptable
presumptions.
To conclude this section, we notice that the idea of commitment can lead to
an interpretation of presupposition not in terms of “common knowledge,” but of
expectations, namely argumentative reasoning. The criteria of non-controversial-
ity and plausibility of acceptance as conditions for presupposing shift the focus
from an analysis of what is known to what can be presumed to be accepted. A
presupposition thus becomes the outcome of a reasoning process, which can be
reasonable or not, and can yield different interpretative conclusions.
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4 Presupposition and presumptive reasoning
The sections above lead to the idea that presuppositions can be analyzed in
terms of presumptions. This account has two crucial implications. First, pre-
suppositions can be investigated considering their reasoning dimension.
Second, presuppositions unshared or unacceptable by the hearer sometimes
can be the trigger of a more complex interpretive reasoning. On this view, the
“unreasonableness” of a presupposition can indicate to the hearer the need of a
non-defaultive interpretation (Giora et al. 2015, 2017).
4.1 Presumptive reasoning
As mentioned above, the decision to take some information as already accepted
by the hearer needs to be grounded on reasons. This aspect distinguishes
between the correction of a merely false presupposition and the accusation of
performing a voluntary inappropriate or infelicitous act. In both cases, the
hearer does not accept a commitment the speaker has treated as belonging to
the former’s “dark-side” commitment store. However, the failure of accepting a
presupposition can occur at two distinct levels:
a. Possibility of acceptance: the presupposition can be identified or recon-
structed but it cannot be accepted (the hearer is known not to accept the
presupposed content);
b. Reasonableness: the presupposition can be identified or reconstructed but
the accommodation reasoning cannot be accepted (the hearer cannot be
presumed to know or accept the presupposed content).
In particular, the reasonableness criterion is based on the notion of presump-
tion, which bridges the gap between the speaker’s and hearer’s mind from an
epistemic and argumentative perspective (Macagno and Walton 2014:chap. 5;
Macagno 2015). This idea is the development of Strawson’s presumption of
knowledge(Strawson 1971:58–59; Kempson 1975:166–167) and the principle of
Relativity developed by Atlas and Levinson (Atlas and Levinson 1981:40):
1. Do not say what you believe to be highly noncontroversial—that is, to be
entailed by the presumptions of the common ground.
2. Take what you hear to be lowly noncontroversial—that is, consistent with
the presumptions of the common ground.
A proposition can be presupposed not only when it is explicitly accepted, but
also when it can be presumed to be part of the hearer’s commitment store
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(see Simons 2013), based on a reasoning that can be represented by means of a
defeasible scheme of reasoning (Walton et al. 2008). This type of reasoning is
called presumptive reasoning, a type of inference that can be described as
follows (Rescher 2006:33):
Premise : P (the proposition representing the presumption) obtains
whenever the condition C obtains unless and until the standard
default proviso D (to the effect that countervailing evidence is at
hand) obtains (Rule).
Premise : Condition C obtains (Fact).
Premise : Proviso D does not obtain (Exception).
Conclusion: P obtains.
The reasoning is grounded on a rational defeasible principle, which can be based
on recurrences, statistics, causal laws, linguistic rules, etc. This principle is only
presumptive, namely it is generally the case, unless some circumstances obtain.
The defeasible nature of presumptions can explain the difference between the
cases iii) and iv) in the section above. In iii), the presupposed propositions can be
presumed to be accepted or acceptable (mothers usually do not know specific
information about their children’s social life), but they are not because a default
proviso obtains. In iv), the presumptions of the speaker are defeated by the
evidence accessible to the speaker (and in conflict with the shared presumptions),
and for this reason they are unacceptable generalizations.
This type of reasoning can be used to describe the nature of the presupposed
propositions, namely the possible reasonable ground on which they are based. A
proposition can be thus presumed to be already accepted by the hearer based on
different types of presumptive rules concerning what an interlocutor can be
expected to accept (or in a stronger sense, to know) (Rescher 2006:6). Such
rules can be classified according to their subject matter, and can include the
following categories:
P. Pragmatic presumptions (relationships between a speech act and the
speaker’s intentions).
P. Linguistic presumptions (commonly accepted meaning of lexical items;
definitions: rules of language…).
P. Encyclopedic presumptions (information that considered to be shared
because it concerns individuals, facts, events, and descriptions of the world
as socially conceived).
P. Behavioral presumptions (habits).
P. Value presumptions (expectations about preferences).
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These categories can be more or less specific, or rather, include defeasible
generalizations more or less related to the participant to the concerned dialogue.
The presumptions can be about the interlocutor as the present individual, or as a
member of a more or less generic culture (Clark 1996:113–115; Kecskes 2013:4;
Kecskes and Zhang 2013). Thus, the types of presumption may have a different
presumptive nature (Specific or Generic). In the first case, the presumptions can
concern the following:
PS. How my interlocutor (H) usually acts linguistically (usually H thanks the
interlocutor very gently when offended);
PS. How H usually uses certain linguistic items (H usually uses the term
“drunk” to mean “tipsy”);
PS. What kind of information H usually knows (H never reads newspapers);
PS. How H behaves (H never writes recommendation letters);
PS. How H orders his preferences (H prefers sincerity to politeness).
The same categories of presumptions can be used to predict the dark-side
commitments of an interlocutor considered as a member of a specific culture
(Kecskes 2015; Macagno and Bigi 2017). The presumptions are thus more generic,
and concern how (based on the observation of the behavior of the concerned
group) an individual belonging to a certain cultural group usually behaves,
what s/he usually holds as true, etc. These latter presumptions are more defea-
sible than the more specific ones, and thus can be defeated by the former and
are more likely to be subject to default when more contextual information
concerning the hearer is provided. The mechanism of presumptive reasoning,
based on the ordering of presumptions, can explain and predict both the
functioning of interpretation in case of shared presuppositions, and the various
phenomena and effects resulting from unshared presuppositions.
4.2 Conflicts of presumptions and non-defaultive
interpretation
The analysis of presuppositions as the conclusion of a pattern of presumptive
reasoning that is subject to default depending on the type and nature of the
presumption allows investigating the rejection of a presupposition and the
process of accommodation in terms of reasonableness. As Strawson pointed
out, the speaker who presupposes a proposition is in a dialectical position
different from the one who has to choose whether to accept it or refuse it. A
presupposition implicitly conveys the presumption that the speaker has reasons
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for taking the presupposed information as already accepted, placing “hearers
who want to object to them in an awkward rhetorical position” (Potts, 2015, p.
174). An unacceptable (or rejected) presupposition amounts to a mistake in
reasoning, or even a form of unreasonableness resulting from contradicting
premises.
For example, we analyze the presumption carried by the aforementioned
sentence “The king of France is wise” uttered in the present days:
Premise : P (H accepts that there is a king of France/that France is a
monarchy) obtains whenever the condition C (H belongs to the
community of people informed on the political situation of
important countries) obtains unless and until the standard
default proviso D (H is a child: H is completely disinterested in
what happens in the world, etc.) obtains (Rule).
Premise : Condition C obtains (Fact).
Premise : Proviso D does not obtain (Exception).
Conclusion: P (H accepts that there is a king of France) obtains.
This type of reasoning represents the speaker’s presumptive reasoning, which
can be evaluated by comparing the presumptive rule with the presumptions
available in the given culture. The speaker’s generic encyclopedic presumption
(P2G. France is usually known to be a monarchy) conflicts with evidence (France
is a republic), backing another generic and stronger encyclopedic presumption
(P2G. France is known to be a republic).
This conflict of presumptions can be explained by the hearer in different ways.
S/he can explain the mistaken presumption as caused by the fact that the speaker
is disoriented in time (namely assuming a default condition D). Otherwise, s/he
can assess the linguistic presumption that “king” refers to “a man who holds by
life tenure, and usually by hereditary right, the chief authority over a country and
people,” and assume that the speaker is speaking metaphorically to mean “a
politician who is concentrating too much power”1 (default of a linguistic presump-
tion) (Ducrot 1966:42). This type of non-presumptive interpretation can be
explained through the assessment of the presumptions available to the hearer
and the evidence available:
1 For an actual interpretive debate over the “king of France” see the discussion between the
former president of France, Sarkozy, and a journalist, Mr Joffrin, accusing the former of having
turned France into a monarchy. Sarkozy replied that as far as he knows, his father did not
enthrone him as the king. See Troisième conférence de presse en quatre ans pour Sarkozy, Le
Monde.fr 24 January 2011, retrieved from https://is.gd/aq8oDR (accessed on 23 March 2017).
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1. P2G. France is usually known to be a monarchy (presumed by the speaker).
2. P2G. France is known to be a republic.
3. Evidence: France is a republic.
Conflict of presumptions 1 and 2: need of explanation. Assessing available
presumptions:
4. P0S. The speaker is not joking (he aims at informing the hearer).
5. P2S. The speaker is presumably aware of the most important information
concerning the world (Evidence: s/he is not in a daze nor confused)
6. P1G. A “king” usually means “a man holding [ … ] the chief authority over a
country and people.”
In this case, the hearer has to weigh the various available presumptions and
exclude the most defeasible one considering the available evidence. While the
encyclopedic and pragmatic presumptions are backed by evidence and hardly
likely to be defeated in the given context, the linguistic presumption at point 6 is
only a generic presumption, which can be subject to default, leading to a
metaphorical interpretation.
The same mechanism of weighting and assessing the available presump-
tions can explain other types of non-defaultive interpretation. For example, we
consider the following sentence (Macagno and Capone 2016):
<On a sign posted in a restaurant > Thank you for not smoking.
The presupposed content triggered by “thank you for” cannot be taken for granted
by the speaker, as it cannot be presumed to be shared, accepted, or acceptable by
the hearer. The conflict of presumptions can be represented as follows:
1. P3G. People entering a restaurant usually have decided not to smoke in the
restaurant (presumed by the speaker).
2. P3G. People usually smoke in restaurants.
3. Evidence: In absence of regulations to the contrary, people usually smoke in
public places.
Conflict of presumptions 1 and 2: need of explanation. Assessing available
presumptions:
4. P0G. “Thank you” is usually used to thank the interlocutor for a curtesy,
service, or favor.
5. Evidence: The hearer has not done any courtesy, service, or favor.
6. P2G. The speaker is presumably aware of the most important information
concerning the world.
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7. P1G. Whoever writes signs in restaurants usually uses words with their
ordinary (most accessible) meaning.
Among the available presumptions, the pragmatic one (at 4) is the weakest
one, as it conflicts with the available evidence and other presumptions (at 5 and
6). For this reason, the purpose of the utterance needs to be explained in a non-
presumptive fashion. Since it introduces a commitment to a specific action (the
hearer becomes committed to “not smoking”) without the hearer’s previous
acceptance, the communicative purpose is to impose a commitment (namely,
ordering the hearer not to smoke). The communicative effect is different from an
explicit order, as the result of not accepting the commitment is not a breach of a
command but a rejection of an expression of gratitude.
The examples of acceptable and unacceptable presuppositions explained in
this section show how presuppositions can be analyzed considering the reasons
underlying their status of “previously accepted” propositions. They are treated
by the speaker as the hearer’s dark-side commitments. For this reason, they
carry a specific presumption that the speaker has reasons to draw this conclu-
sion. This dialectical effect can be analyzed as a pattern of reasoning grounded
on presumptive rules, which in turn can be examined by taking into account
their type and their nature. The presumptive reasoning on which a presupposi-
tion is based can be thus brought to light and its reasonableness assessed,
pointing out the presumptions used and their possible defaults (Geurts
1999:32–33).
5 Conclusion
This paper advanced a dialectical approach to presupposition rooted in the
concept of commitment. In particular, in this approach the “logical” dimen-
sion of presupposition is used to explain its dialogical behavior, which is
accounted for in terms of commitment, a dialectical notion weaker than truth
and belief (or knowledge).
The ancient and medieval dialectical works provided two distinct insights
for the analysis of presupposition. First, from the point of view of the assessment
of a sentence-token (excluding incomplete or spurious sentences), a false pre-
supposition results in the falsity of the whole sentence. In this fashion, it is
possible to check the consistency of the interlocutors’ commitment set, or the
negation of presuppositions in specific assertive speech acts. Second, from a
dialectical point of view, presuppositions are also characterized by a pragmatic
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dimension, namely the alteration of the dialectical order of acceptance. A pre-
supposition is a proposition that the speaker can consider as already included in
the hearer’s commitment store, so s/he can act as it were part of the hearer’s
commitments without securing its acceptance. A false presupposition is thus a
disruption of the order of acceptance, and can be denied either at a logical level
(assessment level – “p is false”) or at a pragmatic level (denying the previous
acceptance of the presupposition – “I have never accepted p”).
In this paper, the implications of a dialectical approach have been devel-
oped, focusing on the reasoning mechanism characterizing both the speaker’s
presupposition and the hearer’s acceptance or reconstruction and interpretation
thereof. The view proposed is grounded on the premises that a presupposition is
a proposition previously accepted by the hearer, and that such an acceptance
cannot be known, but only presumed. Therefore, the speaker needs to have
reasons for presupposing, namely for concluding that the hearer has already
accepted a presupposed proposition. S/he can access the interlocutor’s accep-
tance of a proposition only through presumptive reasoning, aimed at drawing
conclusions from premises describing the ordinary or normal expectations.
On this perspective, presuppositions are investigated in terms of presump-
tions, defeasible generalizations that can be weighted and assessed in the
interpretative process. Presumptions can be classified according to their content
and nature in types having different levels of generalizations (namely concern-
ing a broader or narrower group or only the interlocutor), and depending on
their specificity, they can be more or less subject to default. A false (or rather
unaccepted) presupposition can be thus represented as the result of an under-
lying defaulted or even unsound pattern of presumptive reasoning.
At the interpretative level, unaccepted presuppositions are regarded as a
conflict of presumptions that can be explained by comparing the available
presumptions and evidence. On this view, when confronted with an unaccepted
or unacceptable presupposition, the hearer can assess the underlying reasoning
and provide the best explanation of the apparent flawed implicit reasoning. In
this fashion, s/he can detect the default of the weakest presumption, and replace
it with a stronger one, backed by the available evidence. This “operational”
approach to presupposition in terms of presumptive reasoning can provide a
bridge between pragmatics and the modern developments of ancient dialectics,
including the studies in the fields of argumentation, logic, and cognitive psy-
chology. More importantly, it can account for the effects and problems of
intercultural and intracultural differences (Macagno and Walton 2014:chap. 5;
Macagno and Capone 2016; Macagno 2012b; Macagno and Bigi 2017) and the
possible different interpretations that are triggered by unacceptable
presuppositions.
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